“Shahed” drones, “Dan-T,” and a ballistic strike: What Russia is preparing for the end of September — Kryvolap’s forecast
1 September 18:01
FORECAST
Kyiv and a number of Ukrainian cities have been living under almost constant air raid alerts for several days in a row. Russian occupation forces have changed their tactics. Instead of simultaneous, massive salvos, they have shifted to exhausting, protracted attacks using small groups of drones. In an interview with "Komersant Ukrainian", aviation expert Konstantin Kryvolap discussed new technological challenges, delays in the production of interceptor drones, tragic incidents at warehouses, and the realistic timeline for creating Ukraine’s own anti-ballistic shield.
What is new about Russia’s tactics?
In recent days, residents of the capital have been witnessing a new pattern of enemy attacks: air raid alerts last for hours, the all-clear is sounded, and just 30–40 minutes later, enemy UAVs re-enter the city’s airspace. According to Konstantin Kryvolap, Russia has radically changed its paradigm and methods for achieving its goals.
“The enemy’s main method now is constant psychological pressure and provocation of the population. The Russians are trying to create an atmosphere of hopelessness to force Ukrainian society and the government to surrender. Added to this are our internal problems: scandals surrounding mobilization, corruption, and personnel reshuffles that aren’t always clear,” Kryvolap notes.
From a technical standpoint, Russia has reached an industrial production capacity of approximately 3,000 “Shaheds” (including jet-powered variants) per month. This translates to the ability to launch about 100 UAVs per day.
“There are 1,440 minutes in a day. If you divide that by 100 drones, it turns out that the enemy launches 5–6 drones every hour. By spending, in the worst-case scenario, about $1 million per hour, the Russians are bringing life in a metropolis like Kyiv to a near-complete standstill,” explains Kryvolap.
The expert warns that this tactic is only the first stage. In late September or early October, the occupiers may combine jet- and propeller-driven “Shahed” drones, decoy drones (simulators), cheap “Dan-T”-type missile drones, as well as the stockpile of ballistic and cruise missiles accumulated during this time.
Why are there still no interceptor drones?
Just a year ago, the Ukrainian media was actively discussing the development of domestic interceptor drones designed to destroy enemy UAVs in flight. However, in practice, there has been no widespread use of these systems to date.
“Even last year, it was clear that the ‘Shahed’ would be developed along two lines: a significant increase in speed (up to 500–550 km/h thanks to jet engines) and improvements in jamming resistance, communications, and guidance systems. What was initiated by the relevant agencies has not yet been brought to a proper mass-production level,” Kryvolap notes.
According to the expert, there are already about 10–12 manufacturers in Ukraine that have come close to creating finished prototypes. However, having a prototype does not mean mass production.
“This is less a matter of physical resources than of organizational resources, which we simply cannot channel properly. Following the resignation of those in charge, we effectively have no single person who is fully in charge of the Small-Scale Air Defense system. The first line of defense is electronic warfare and the detection of launch sites as far as 1,500 km from the border. Next, simple interceptors should come into play, followed by fast jet-powered drones and inexpensive surface-to-air missile systems. Until this chain of defense is running like clockwork, the situation will remain difficult,” emphasizes aviation expert Kryvolap.
The “Freya” Project and Domestic Anti-Ballistic Systems
Commenting on Ukraine’s participation, alongside the UK and European partners, in the development of its own ballistic missile interceptor system (the “Freya” project), Kostyantyn Kryvolap expressed cautious optimism regarding the timeline.
The project’s architecture calls for the use of the open Link-16 standard and the involvement of leading Western companies:
- Kongsberg (Norway) — ensuring system integration;
- Firepoint (Ukraine) — development of the F-P7X ballistic/anti-aircraft missile (which has already passed its first tests);
- Diehl Defense (Germany) — supply of homing heads;
- SAAB, Thales, HENSOLDT — radars and positioning systems.
“From a technical standpoint, everything is clear here. We may see the first real-world tests and interceptions as early as the end of this year—in December—or early next year—in January or February. The main problem lies not in the technology, but in political will and the distribution of business interests among the participating countries,” notes Kryvolap.
At the same time, regarding reports that the United Kingdom will transfer technology to localize the production of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles (as well as Aster-30 air-to-surface missiles for the SAMP/T air defense system), Kryvolap urges people not to expect immediate results.
“The Storm Shadow is an extremely expensive and complex missile developed by MBDA. At one time, its production cycle was 48 months, and only recently have European engineers been able to reduce it to 18 months. An optimistic estimate for launching full-scale domestic production in Ukraine is three years; a realistic one is about five years,” the expert concludes.
In the early stages, the focus will be exclusively on the assembly of major subassemblies from components sourced from Europe. However, the main advantage of localization will be that Ukraine will no longer face any political restrictions from its partners regarding the use of these missiles on Russian territory.
Preparing for the Winter Season
Assessing Ukraine’s readiness for the upcoming heating season amid constant attacks on thermal power plants and water utilities, Kostyantyn Kryvolap emphasized that the decentralization of the power grid has not been implemented to the necessary extent.
“The government has not taken any significant steps to create small emergency power systems that would function in the event of a main power outage. The enemy is well aware of the state of our infrastructure, so the main challenge now is to hold our ground and quickly adapt our defense systems to new challenges,” concluded Kostyantyn Kryvolap.
Thus, the enemy’s tactics for air attacks are reaching a new level of technological and psychological pressure. Ukraine needs not just innovation, but the ability to rapidly scale up its own production—from interceptor drones to anti-ballistic systems. Only through the clear organization of small-scale air defense, the acceleration of the localization of Western weapons, and the genuine decentralization of critical infrastructure will the country be able to mount a worthy response to the Kremlin’s new challenges.
