Belarusian springboard for the Kremlin: is a new offensive being prepared from the north?
27 February 20:33
Belarus is once again the focus of Ukraine’s security concerns. Checks on the mobilization readiness of reservists, unscheduled gatherings, and the active use of Belarusian territory for Russian drones to pass through create additional risks for the northern direction. Is there a threat of direct invasion? What resources does the so-called Union State have? And how should Ukraine respond? Read more about this in the article
Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Colonel Pavlo Palisa, clearly outlined Belarus’ current role in the war. He says that Putin is using Belarus as a convenient territory for pressure and for deploying missiles. At the same time, corridors are already being actively used for the passage of “Shaheds” with the use of communication towers to control drone flights. Direct involvement of the Belarusian army poses risks for Lukashenko and has questionable combat value, but as a tool for pressure and blackmail, such a threat is being used, Palisa noted.
Svitan: Lukashenko has no offensive resources
Minsk’s actions are more of a demonstrative nature. He explains in an exclusive comment for
“From a military point of view, Lukashenko is right to raise the alarm. The logic is there, because at this time, European countries were conducting exercises in the Baltic region, transferring tens of thousands of troops to the eastern flank. It looks like a countermeasure to potential aggression,” says Svitan
At the same time, the expert emphasizes that using Belarusian territory to relay and support Russian strikes is already de facto participation in the war.
“The use of Belarusian territory for Russian tasks, especially relaying, is direct participation in hostilities. And this must be responded to by destroying such military facilities, wherever they are located,” Svitan emphasizes.
Economic leverage: pressure through oil pipelines
Separately, Svitan points to the possibility of economic influence on Lukashenko’s regime through energy infrastructure.
This refers, in particular, to the Baltic Pipeline System-2 (BTS-2), which partially supplies the Belarusian Naftan oil refinery, as well as the Druzhba pipeline, which supplies a number of enterprises, including the Moscow oil refinery.
“By putting pressure on Lukashenko through the economy, it is possible to force him to stop helping the Russians — even indirectly,” Svitan believes .
Is a new offensive from the north possible?
The key question is whether Belarus, together with Russia, is capable of forming a strike force for a renewed offensive on Kyiv or Kharkiv. According to Svitan’s assessment, a full-scale offensive operation would require at least 150,000–200,000 Russian troops in the Belarusian direction.
“They do not have these resources at the moment. Russian forces are exhausted on the front line. They need an operational pause to build up reserves. Therefore, at this stage, we are only threatened by indirect participation from Belarus — nothing more,” says Svitan.
The expert also explains the intensification of activity in the Kharkiv region as a diversionary tactic.
“One of the diversionary maneuvers is pressure on the Kharkiv direction to force the General Staff to transfer reserves and disperse forces. But there is no strategic objective to take Kharkiv without deploying a 300,000-strong force, and there cannot be,” says Svitan.
Thus, the Kremlin is using the Belarusian factor as a tool of constant tension. Even without a direct invasion, the very possibility of an attack forces Ukraine to keep significant forces on its northern border.
This is a classic strategy of stretching the enemy’s resources — creating several potential flashpoints to make it difficult to concentrate reserves on key sections of the front.
