Hybrid threats: why Ukraine’s experience is important for Europe
On March 25, the “EU-Ukraine Partnership on Information Security” summit will take place in Brussels. I will have the honor of participating in the first panel discussion, which will focus on hybrid information threats—how they operate, what drives them, and what consequences they have.
As I prepare for this discussion, I want to share the main point: information warfare today is not about fake news per se. It’s about people.
Ukraine has been living in this reality for years. And it knows well: war is not only fought on the front lines—it is fought in people’s minds.
Hybrid attacks don’t look like attacks. They don’t start with obvious lies, but with small things—doubt, fear, irritation. With emotions that gradually erode trust. And most importantly—they don’t invent a new world. They work with what already exists: social divisions, collective trauma, and crisis-related issues.
This is precisely what modern disinformation is built on.
Russia has long moved away from crude propaganda. Today, it’s a subtle manipulation of reality. They take what’s already causing pain in society—and amplify it. Fears about migration, war fatigue, economic instability—none of this is made up. But it is precisely these issues that become the foundation for information attacks.
Manipulation of identity is one of the key tools. People are divided into “us” and “them,” “our own” and “outsiders.” Ukrainians in Europe often become “the others” in this logic—those onto whom it is convenient to shift the blame for problems, ranging from the strain on social systems to cultural conflicts.
But this is only the surface.
Deeper down lies the work with trauma and vulnerabilities. Ukraine is experiencing war and loss. Europe is facing its own crises: the pandemic, political polarization, and economic upheaval. And it is precisely into these cracks that information operations seep.
They don’t create conflicts from scratch. They amplify them.
In recent years, these operations have evolved. Whereas before they consisted of centralized messages, today they are networks: flexible, decentralized, and adaptive. Telegram channels, local media, pseudo-experts, bloggers—often without direct links to one another, but with identical narratives.
And these narratives are simple:
- Ukraine is a problem.
- Ukrainians are a burden.
- Supporting Ukraine is a mistake.
They are repeated over and over—in different words, different languages, on different platforms. And it is this repetition that creates the effect of “truth.”
Ukraine has become a testing ground for these tactics. What has been tested on us for years is now being scaled up to European Union countries.
And this is no longer just about Ukraine.
It’s about the resilience of democratic societies as a whole.
Because the main goal of such operations is not to convince. But to divide. To sow doubt. To destroy trust—in the state, in the media, in one another.
And when trust disappears, society becomes vulnerable.
That is precisely why the response cannot be simple.
It is not enough to simply debunk fake news or react after the fact. Hybrid threats operate at the level of trust—and the response must be at the same level.
From Ukraine’s experience, there are several conclusions that are critically important for Europe today.
First —speed. The response must be immediate or proactive.
Second— coordination. The state, media, experts, and civil society must act together.
Third —education. People who understand the mechanics of manipulation become the strongest defense.
Fourth —partnership. These threats know no borders, so the response cannot be isolated.
The European Union’s recent decisions to expand tools to counter hybrid threats are an important signal. The EU is explicitly stating the need to respond to sabotage, cyber threats, interference in the information space, and manipulation of public discourse.
This means the problem has been recognized. There is political will to act.
But the key question is the speed and depth of implementation of these decisions.
Because hybrid threats change every day. They adapt to new conditions, new countries, and new vulnerabilities.
And here, the Ukrainian experience is not about the past. It is about what is already working.
Ukraine has learned to live under constant informational pressure. Europe has the institutional capacity to scale up solutions.
And together, this can yield results that cannot be achieved alone.
My main conclusion is simple: resilience is not the absence of attacks.
Resilience is the ability to maintain trust and not allow oneself to be divided.
And this is precisely what is becoming the foundation of security today—for both Ukraine and all of Europe.
