Energy, army, identity: how Kazakhstan is turning its back on Russia
22 July 2025 13:05
ANALYSIS
Astana is signaling more and more clearly that the era of Kremlin domination of its foreign policy is coming to an end. Kazakhstan, historically linked to Russia through economic, military and cultural ties, is taking decisive steps to diversify its partnerships and reduce its dependence on Moscow.
Energy independence
In July 2025, the Kazakh government announced the start of construction of three new thermal power plants in the cities of Kentau, Kostanay, and Semey. Unlike previous projects, these thermal power plants are being built without the participation of Russian contractors or equipment suppliers. According to the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan, Astana rejected the offer of the Russian company Inter RAO to finance the project in Ust-Kamenogorsk, preferring domestic resources and Chinese investment.
This move is part of a broader energy diversification strategy. In 2023, Kazakhstan introduced a new brand of oil, KEBCO, which it exports through the port of Baku in Azerbaijan, bypassing the Russian port of Novorossiysk. According to Reuters, the volume of exports via the Trans-Caspian route increased by 22% compared to 2022, which avoids the risks associated with sanctions against Russia.
Reducing Russia’s economic influence
Economic dependence on Russia is also decreasing. According to the State Statistics Committee of Kazakhstan, in the first quarter of 2025, 728 Russian companies ceased operations in the Kazakh market. Some of them left voluntarily due to sanctions risks, while others were pushed out by competitors from China, Turkey, and the EU.
At the same time, Russia’s share of Kazakhstan’s exports decreased from 20% in 2022 to 17% in 2024, while trade with China and Turkey increased by 15% and 10%, respectively. In 2023, China even overtook Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner.
Kazakhstan has also stopped supplying Russia with nitrocellulose, which is necessary for the production of smokeless gunpowder, and redirected exports to NATO countries.
In addition, since June 2025, Kazakhstan has tightened inspections of cargo bound for Russia, resulting in delays of up to 10 days at the border. This complicates gray schemes to circumvent sanctions, which previously included the supply of semiconductors worth $3.7 million in 2022.
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Military reorientation
In the security sphere, Kazakhstan is increasingly choosing Western and Turkic partners. In January 2025, Astana signed a two-year military cooperation plan with the United Kingdom, which provides for the education of Kazakh officers in British academies, joint military training, and intelligence sharing.
At the same time, Kazakhstan is purchasing Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and plans to localize their production.
The country is also reforming its army to NATO standards, increasing its defense budget by 50% to $2.5 billion in 2024. At the same time, Astana is distancing itself from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): President Tokayev did not participate in the CSTO summit in December 2024, delegating representation to a lower level.
Turkic vector and national identity
Kazakhstan is actively developing ties with Turkic states through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). In 2024, at the OST summit in Shymkent, agreements were signed with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan on joint infrastructure projects and cultural exchange.
Nurlan Saltayev, a Ukrainian political observer from Kazakhstan and author of the book Turkic Calendar, told that during the 150-year colonial period, Russia’s role was hypertrophied and practically supplanted everything national, from the economic to the spiritual life of the Kazakhs.
He notes that an alternative to Russia should be an alliance with a number of states: Turkey, Pakistan, and neighboring Central Asian countries.
“Turkey, as a fraternal Turkic and Muslim state, is preferable for Kazakhstan. Even if it dominates, the Kazakh Turkic and Muslim identity will remain. But I am sure that interaction with Turkey will not be about absorbing Kazakh culture, but about mutual enrichment,”
– Saltaev believes.
Reaction to the war in Ukraine
Kazakhs observe attempts of aggressive absorption by Russia on the example of Ukraine, which resists Russian aggression.
After the full-scale invasion, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, although taking a neutral position, refused to recognize the so-called “LPR” and “DPR” and support the circumvention of sanctions against Russia.
At an economic forum in St. Petersburg in June 2022, Tokayev publicly stated that Kazakhstan does not recognize quasi-state entities.
Ordinary Kazakhs were more open in their support for Ukraine. In March 2022, anti-war rallies were held in several cities of Kazakhstan. For example, in Almaty, about 2000 people protested against Russian aggression, chanting slogans for peace and solidarity with Ukraine.
The Kazakh authorities allowed these rallies, which is rare for a country with limited freedoms of assembly. This indicates a certain tolerance for pro-Ukrainian sentiments in society.
Nurlan Saltayev, commenting on Kazakhs’ attitudes towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, said:
“The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the further away the war in Kazakhstan will be. Kazakhstan realizes that today Ukraine is a barrier between it and Russia. After the war, the question will arise: what to do with 500,000 drug addicts and alcoholics from the marginalized army of the Russian Federation and what to do with the production of weapons, albeit outdated ones.
There is a possibility that part of this “surplus” could be transferred to Kazakhstan. And if they die there, the Kremlin will not care.”
Russian threats and challenges
Moscow perceives Kazakhstan’s steps as a threat to the concept of the “Russian world.” Russian propagandists, in particular on the Rossiya-1 channel, have repeatedly called for the “protection” of the Russian-speaking population in the northern regions of Kazakhstan, where about 3.5 million Russians and Russian-speaking citizens live. Such rhetoric is reminiscent of the scenarios used by Russia before the annexation of Crimea.
In August 2022, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, wrote on VKontakte that Kazakhstan was an “artificial state” created on “Russian soil.” The post was later deleted, explaining the incident as a hack of the account. However, many commentators believe that the post reflected the true sentiments of a part of the Kremlin elite.
In the same year, State Duma deputy Oleg Matveychev said that Kazakhstan was “following the path of Ukraine,” alluding to Astana’s allegedly anti-Russian policy. He called on the Kremlin to “take action,” including by putting pressure on Kazakhstan’s northern regions.
Despite all the threats, Astana is trying to get out from under Moscow’s influence. In Kazakhstan, this process is taking place cautiously but consistently. The authorities demonstrate a willingness to defend their independence and sovereignty.
And ordinary Kazakhs-volunteers, entrepreneurs, and artists-are already showing an example of sincere solidarity with Ukraine. The Yurts of Fortitude in Bucha, Dnipro, Novovolynsk and Kyiv have become symbols of this support. This is not just an act of friendship, but a sign of deep respect for Ukrainians who are fighting for their freedom – and for the common future of independent nations in the post-Soviet space.
Author: Asif Aliyev
