Russia throws understaffed reserves into battle – ISW
15 July 2024 08:45
The Russian military command may have deployed insufficiently equipped and understaffed units from the operational reserve to the fighting in eastern Ukraine. This is the conclusion reached by analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in their latest report, "Komersant Ukrainian" reports.
According to Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, the Russian command planned to form the 27th Motorised Infantry Division as an operational reserve for the Central Group of Forces. This division was to be used in the event of a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Avdiivka sector or to support a Russian offensive in the Toretsk sector.
However, according to Mashovets, the Russian command changed its plans:
- the 433rd Motorised Rifle Regiment of the 27th Division, formed from the remnants of the 21st Motorised Rifle Brigade, was redeployed to the area northwest of Avdiivka until its combat capability was fully restored.
- the 506th and 589th motorised rifle regiments were sent to the Toretsk area ahead of schedule, failing to reach the “planned deadline” for readiness.
It is important to note that as early as March 2024, Mashovets reported on the Russian command’s plans to equip units of the 27th Motorised Rifle Division with only 87% of the required amount of weapons and equipment. It was also planned to prepare the 433rd, 506th and 598th motorised rifle regiments for combat operations in late spring or early summer 2024.
ISW analysts note that they first noticed reports of the 27th Motorised Rifle Division’s units operating near Avdiivka in April 2024 and near Toretsk in early July 2024. This may indicate that the Russian military command has fallen behind the planned manning and arming schedule and has not even reached the 87% target.
The ISW suggests that two factors may account for this failure:
- Limitations of the Russian defence industrial base, which do not allow for the full equipping of new units.
- Attempts to intensify the current offensive operations in eastern Ukraine by sacrificing the quality of reserve training.
ISW experts have previously assessed that Russia’s current efforts to deploy its armed forces create a small number of additional forces. These forces are not immediately sent to the front as reinforcements, but can be used to gradually build up operational reserves. However, analysts doubt that Russia’s defence industry base is able to fully supply its reserves with the necessary weapons and equipment.
