Critical resource: what will protect the Ukrainian power system from blackouts
9 October 11:46
ANALYSIS FROM 
The word “blackout” is reappearing on social media and in private conversations among Ukrainians, reminiscent of the events of the fall of 2022. But is there any reason for something like this now – "Komersant Ukrainian" found out.
The objects and locations on Ukrainian territory that have been shelled by the Russians in recent days give a clear idea of the purpose of such attacks – to create problems with energy supply, even if not for the whole of Ukraine at the same time, but at least for residents of certain regions, in particular those close to the demarcation line.
Targets of the attacks
on October 1, the invaders attacked a substation in Slavutych, Kyiv region, with drones, leaving the city without power. On the same day, a massive attack on the energy infrastructure of Chernihiv region forced emergency blackouts and left part of the region without power. Power facilities in Sumy region were also hit – Konotop and Shostka districts were partially left without electricity. On the night of October 2 to 3, the enemy launched the largest massive attack on gas production infrastructure in Kharkiv and Poltava regions since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. On the night of October 5, the Lviv region was attacked, where energy infrastructure facilities were targeted, among other things. on October 7, the energy infrastructure of Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions was attacked again – more than 26 attacks in total.
According to Olena Lapenko, General Manager of Security and Resilience Advisory Services at DiXi Group, the latest attacks were massive drone and missile strikes on substations, power lines, distribution system facilities, and some energy generation or production points.
“These attacks were targeted at two points: damaging the “nodal” elements, leading to large-scale local outages, and reducing the possibility of prompt recovery by striking at logistics and equipment storage facilities. However, the latest massive strike over the weekend showed that the Russians have not given up trying to strike remote regions. Thus, the enemy’s current tactics are largely similar to those we saw in the fall of 2022, but active attacks on gas infrastructure have been added,” the expert said.
In fact, the enemy changes its tactics regularly. Andrian Prokip, Head of Energy Programs at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, points this out.
“If we look at the hostile actions of September-October 2022, at first they were attacks on the facilities of the United Energy System and they were more concentrated: at some points they focused on transmission substations, at some on generation. And if they saw that there was no effect, they changed their tactics. In fact, large-scale attacks on the power system ended in 2024. In January-February 2025, there were several massive attacks on gas production. But when the enemy saw that we had replaced gas production with imports, they started attacking the gas transportation system in the summer. That is, they are quite flexible in their choice of targets and tactics. Now we are again seeing attacks on gas production and attacks on the electricity infrastructure, primarily in those regions that are essentially borderline. These are Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv regions. In fact, those nodes that connect these regions with the rest of the power grid are under attack,” the expert states.
According to Lapenko, the main problem remains the same: the physical vulnerability of “big energy” facilities to high-precision weapons. In her opinion, only multicomponent air defense, not physical shelters, can provide full protection against ballistic and cruise missiles.
Protection of energy facilities
Power engineers are restoring electricity to the affected regions as quickly as possible. However, the fact that power supply was disrupted in several regions clearly indicates that the security of power facilities is insufficient. And Ukrenergo has received a lot of criticism these days, including for the fact that, according to MP Oleksiy Kucherenko, the protective structures were primarily built for Ukrenergo’s transformer substations. At the same time, the substations of regional energy companies are practically unprotected.
How can we assess the readiness of energy facilities for Russian shelling? Olena Lapenko, General Manager of Security and Resilience Advisory Services at DiXi Group, explains.
“The readiness of Ukrainian energy facilities can be assessed by three main dimensions: physical protection; rapid response (recovery speed, mobile teams, spare transformers, generators, other equipment); system planning (backup generating capacity, availability of imports, dispatching algorithms in case of power nodes failure). According to available information, Ukraine has been actively working in all these areas. At the same time, the attacks remain massive and concentrated, so the protection effect may not always work,” the expert emphasizes.
Andrian Prokip, Head of Energy Programs at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, draws attention to some other issues in the organization of protection of energy facilities.
“First, not all energy facilities can be physically protected by some arches or something similar. You also need to understand that the process of building protective structures is time-consuming. In addition, it cannot be done simultaneously at all facilities, because technically, it involves the temporary shutdown of a facility or the construction of a backup facility. It turns out that, as they say, we are as prepared as we could be. However, the fact that after 3 years of energy terror we have uninterrupted electricity, electricity and heat supply still indicates the accumulated readiness for shelling,” the expert believes.
Possibility of blackout
Despite the fact that the enemy has not been able to disrupt the stability of the Ukrainian energy system, the word “blackout” has been appearing more often in social media in recent days. And it is not always possible to explain this by some simple desire to psychologically prepare Ukrainians for possible problems. But is there any reason to expect a blackout in Ukraine? As a reminder, a blackout is described as a complete or almost complete cessation of power supply over a large area as a result of a cascading power outage. And blackouts happen all over the world, which was once again confirmed this summer by the experience of Spain. Andrian Prokip, Head of Energy Programs at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, continues.
“The functioning of the energy system requires compliance with a number of conditions. This is a complete balance, i.e. consumption corresponds to production. This is the preservation of frequency throughout the power system. This is synchronization. When this is violated, the power system can fall apart: either the automation starts to shut down, or it is a cascading accident,” the expert notes.
Olena Lapenko, General Manager of Security and Resilience Advisory Services at DiXi Group, adds that unlike planned outage schedules, blackouts are always sudden and uncontrollable. She also explains what the introduction of outage schedules means: on the one hand, these schedules signal the critical state of the system and the approach to the limit of its capabilities, and on the other hand, they are a means of preventing blackouts. An alarming signal is a sharp increase in the duration of outages or their chaotic nature, which may indicate a loss of control over the balancing of the power system.
Olena Lapenko also draws attention to another important point.
“For Ukrainians, the negative scenario is not the blackout itself, but the shortage of generating capacities or the inability to transfer electricity to a particular region. This creates long-term negative consequences. To illustrate this, let’s take the same blackout in Spain as an example – the system was “reassembled” and all consumers were powered within about 12 hours. While after the Russian strikes on generation in the spring of 2024, many Ukrainians were without electricity for 12 hours a day throughout the summer,” the expert recalls.
Of course, as Olena Lapenko notes, due to Russian shelling, which directly affects the stability of the grid, the risks of blackout are much higher for Ukraine than for other European countries. The risk is further increased during peak load periods – winter months with temperatures down to -20°C or summer months with temperatures above 30°C. That is why, according to Olena Lapenko, Russians are stepping up their efforts to weaken the power system before such a difficult period.
Resilience of the power system
The key question is how resilient is the Ukrainian energy system today? In answering this question, it should be borne in mind that assessments of the power system’s resilience are very relative at the moment, as only a limited number of people have all the data, which is justified in a time of war. According to Olena Lapenko, General Manager of Security and Resilience Advisory Services at DiXi Group, the system has definitely become more resilient than in the first year of the full-scale invasion.
“We have expanded our import capabilities from the EU, created mobile repair teams, accumulated a stock of equipment and partially protected critical facilities. The Ukrainian power system is designed to transmit much more power than we are currently using. It is also highly branched. This makes it possible to build bypass routes, quickly supplying power to consumers. However, the resilience is conditional – it directly depends on the intensity and nature of the attacks. If the attacks hit nodal transformers and trunk substations, the consequences can be extremely serious,” says Lapenko.
That is why, according to her, it is crucial to strengthen air defense and quickly restore damaged facilities.
“No matter how much concrete we build over the substations, it can be destroyed – it all depends on the number of missiles and drones. This does not mean that we do not need to build shelters. It means that physical shelters should be built simultaneously with the strengthening of air defense,” the expert emphasizes.
The recipe for resilience is obvious and has been tested for effectiveness many times over the years of war. And the key words in this recipe are not “attacks” and “blackout” but “build”, “restore”, “strengthen”, “protect”, “work”.
Author: Serhiy Vasylovych
