Russia’s strategic losses: what is known about the planes destroyed in the historic SBU operation

2 June 15:09
ANALYSIS

on June 1, 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine conducted one of the most daring operations in the Russian-Ukrainian war: according to the SBU, 41 strategic military aircraft were hit in the Russian rear as a result of a drone attack. The service claims that this is about a third of the strategic cruise missile carriers in Russia.

According to Ukrainian security officials, the losses for the Russian army amount to more than $7 billion. And more importantly, some of these aircraft cannot be restored or rebuilt because they are out of production or were manufactured in the Soviet Union with components that simply do not exist today.

Why it is important

Strategic aviation is not just about airplanes. It is Russia’s main tool for launching massive long-range cruise missile strikes, including against targets in Ukraine. The Tu-95MS and Tu-160 are capable of launching missiles from thousands of kilometers away without entering Ukrainian airspace. And the A-50 aircraft provide airborne control and guidance, without which the effectiveness of combat missions is reduced significantly.

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What exactly did Russia lose?

In this article , "Komersant Ukrainian" will describe in detail the four types of aircraft that, according to the SBU, were destroyed or disabled as a result of the Ukrainian attack: Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, A-50 and Tu-160. They are considered the most valuable units of Russian long-range aviation. Let’s take a look at their characteristics, role in the war, cost and current number in Russia. We used only open sources to prepare this article.

Tu-95MS: “Bear” with cruise missiles

Strategic bomber-missile carrier with turboprop engines, developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau in the mid-twentieth century. It is designed to destroy important enemy targets at long range (including nuclear weapons) in all weather conditions.

  • Crew: 7 people.
  • Range: up to 13,000 km (combat radius ≈6500 km).
  • Maximum speed: ≈920 km/h (≈830-950 km/h at high altitudes).
  • Weapons: air-to-ground cruise missiles: the internal bomb bay can hold up to 6 X-55/X-555 missiles, and the external bomb bay can carry up to 12 newer X-101/102 missiles; also has anti-aircraft machine guns (for self-defense) and bombs (total payload weight ≈9,000 kg).
  • Cost: One strategic bomber is estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. For comparison, a modernized Tu-160 costs ≈250 million dollars, and an A-50 aircraft costs ≈330 million dollars.
  • Production time: no new Tu-95MSs are produced (the last fuselage was assembled in the USSR), and the restoration of old aircraft (repair/modernization) takes several months to years.
  • Production status: no serial production is underway. There are no Ukrainian components for the Tu-95MS (previously, the X-55 missiles were made in Ukraine, but the aircraft itself is assembled from Russian parts).
  • Numbers: according to The Wall Street Journal (IISS), before Operation Spider’s Web, Russia had about 58 Tu-95MS. After the strikes, at least several aircraft were destroyed: satellite images of the Belaya airfield showed 3 destroyed and 1 damaged Tu-95MS.
  • Bases: Traditionally based at long-range airfields – in particular, the 122nd Tu-95M regiment at Belaya (Irkutsk region) and the 184th Guards regiment at Engels (Saratov region). From here, Tu-95s carry out missile strikes against Ukraine (flying over the Caspian, Azov and Black Seas, and the Barents Sea).

Role in Russia’s strategy

The Tu-95MS is the main long-range cruise missile carrier capable of hitting strategic targets, including nuclear targets. It was produced at aircraft factories in Taganrog (Beriev Design Bureau) and Perm (Aviakor). It made its first flight in 1952 and has been in service since 1956 (the modernized Tu-95MS version appeared in 1981).

The strategic importance of the Tu-95MS is hard to overestimate. It is one of the key carriers of long-range cruise missiles capable of hitting targets at a distance of more than 5,000 kilometers. In the reality of nuclear deterrence, it serves as an “airborne platform” capable of launching missiles without entering the enemy’s air defense zone. Because of its long range, it remains in service despite its obsolescence.

The destruction of several Tu-95MS is a blow not only to the real potential of Russia’s strategic aviation, but also to its reputation as a nuclear power. The loss of such aircraft is practically not compensated for, as the full-scale production of new ones is technically complex and time-consuming – about 5-6 years, given the narrow specialization of production.

Tu-22M3: the supersonic “hammer” of the Russian military

A supersonic strategic bomber with adjustable wing geometry. Developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau on the basis of the previous Tu-22M; in service since 1973 (M3 modernization). Designed for cruise missile and bomb attacks on land and sea targets (including nuclear warheads). It was produced at the Kazan Aircraft Plant (KAPO) and other Tupolev facilities.

  • Crew: 4 people.
  • Maximum speed: 2300 km/h.
  • Maximum range: ≈6800 km.
  • Armament: up to 3 supersonic anti-ship/strategic missiles X-22 (or new X-32); internal compartments can hold air bombs (total weight ≈24,000 kg).
  • Role: an important strategic strike carrier for Russia, providing fast massive missile strikes. During the war, it was used to launch long-range supersonic missiles at Ukraine (mainly from the Arctic).
  • Developer: Tupolev Design Bureau (manufacturer – Kazan Aircraft Plant No. 22).
  • Cost: approximately $150-200 million (exact figures are not published).
  • Production time: no new Tu-22M3s are being built (serial production was closed in the early 90s); restoration of old ones is also difficult.
  • Production status: not produced since the end of the 20th century. Does not contain any Ukrainian components.
  • Number: before the operation – 54 aircraft; after – at least 4 destroyed at the Belaya airfield (pictures showed 4 Tu-22M3s on fire).
  • Bases: the main airfields are Olenya (Murmansk region) and Diagilevo (Ryazan region) (also known as the part in Shaykovka). From here, Tu-22M3s regularly launched missiles at Ukraine.

Role in Russia’s strategy

The Tu-22M3 has a special role in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is a tactical-level bomber capable of carrying guided and unguided munitions. It was this aircraft that launched the X-22 missiles that repeatedly hit Ukrainian cities, including Dnipro, Kremenchuk, and Vinnytsia.

The destruction of the Tu-22M3 reduces Russia’s ability to conduct long-range, high-intensity strikes, especially against rear infrastructure. In addition, the loss of these aircraft strikes at the image of Russian aviation as the “second army of the world” based on unpunished terror from the air.

A-50 “Bumblebee”: the eyes and ears of Russian aviation

An airborne long-range radar detection and control (AWACS) aircraft based on the IL-76 transport aircraft. Developed by the Beriev Design Bureau, it was put into service in 1984-1989 (first flight in 1978). It is used to create a panoramic air situation: Vega radars detect air and sea targets at a range of hundreds of kilometers and control groups of aircraft.

  • Crew: 5 pilots up to 10 operators (≈15 people).
  • Cruising speed: ≈800 km/h.
  • Practical range: ≈7500 km (without refueling).
  • Armament: none (the aircraft is not designed to carry weapons; it is equipped with electronic warfare systems and a standard self-defense system).
  • Role: the “eye” of strategic aviation – it carries out long-range radar patrols, can simultaneously track dozens of targets (up to 50) within a radius of 230-400 km and transmit data to fighters. It controls groups of aircraft over the battlefield, increasing the effectiveness of strikes and defense (Airborne Early Warning and Control).
  • Developer: Beriev Design Bureau (technical project manager – Vega Research Institute); manufactured at a plant in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
  • Cost: One A-50 costs ≈$330 million.
  • Production time: no new A-50s are produced (production ended in the 1990s); modernized A-50U and the new A-100 project are alternatives.
  • Production status: not in production. Ukraine used to produce the airplane itself (Il-76) and radars, but now the components are Russian or Belarusian. There are no Ukrainian parts in modern A-50s.
  • Numbers: It is believed that about 10-12 A-50s are in service in Russia (another 3-4 were in conservation). In 2022-24, two A-50s were shot down in the war, and currently there are about 9-10 active ones. There is no information on specific quantitative losses during the “Spider’s Web”.
  • Bases: the main airfield was Ivanovo-Severny (Ivanovo region); A-50s were also used at Diaghilev (Ryazan) and others for rotation. From there, they were on duty over the western and northern directions.

Role in Russia’s strategy

The A-50 is a critical element of air combat control. It provides target detection, fighter guidance, space monitoring and real-time command transmission. It is an air control center, without which full coordination of combat aircraft is virtually impossible.

The destruction of one A-50 is not just the loss of an aircraft, but a serious “blind spot” for the entire air defense system and the Russian air force in a certain area. Since there are no new A-50s being produced, and the modernized versions are very rare (A-50U), their loss is critically painful. Ukraine already shot down an A-50 in early 2024, and this strike continues a series of strategic air defeats.

Tu-160: Russia’s “White Swan”

A new generation supersonic strategic bomber with an adjustable wing. Developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau in the early 1980s, it is considered the most powerful in the Tu family. It is designed to launch cruise missiles at ultra-long distances (it can also carry nuclear warheads). In service since 1987-1989.

  • Crew: 4 people.
  • Maximum speed: 2200 km/h (≈ Mach 2).
  • Maximum range without refueling: ≈13,900 km. When refueled, it is practically unlimited.
  • Armament: up to 12 X-55/X-555 cruise missiles in the internal compartment and up to 12 modern X-101/102 on external suspensions; can also carry free-fall bombs (total bomb load weight – tens of tons). In all modifications, the Tu-160 is capable of using nuclear warheads.
  • Role: the main supersonic cruise missile carrier of the Russian Federation. Since the beginning of the invasion, it has been regularly deployed for massive strikes against targets in Ukraine (usually taking off from bases in the interior of Russia).
  • Developer: Tupolev Design Bureau; mass-produced at the Kazan Aircraft Plant (KAPO). A few dozen were built (about 36 units). The current modernized version (Tu-160M2) has been redesigned: the first aircraft flew from scratch in January 2022.
  • Cost: One Tu-160M2 is estimated at ≈$250 million.
  • Production time: Soviet production was shut down in 1991; after a long break, Tu-160M2 construction resumed in the 2010s. Each new M2 takes years to build (the ramp-up rate is several years per unit). After the full-scale invasion, the pace slowed down due to sanctions.
  • Components: Soviet Tu-160 aircraft used Ukrainian hydraulic control motors (produced by the Novokramatorsk plant), but Russia plans to fully transfer the equipment to its own production.
  • Number: Before the war, there were about 13 active aircraft. During Operation Web, there were reports of damage to two Tu-160s at Belaya airfield. If confirmed, these losses will leave about 11 aircraft in service (the rest are undergoing repair or modernization).
  • Bases: The main airfield is Engels-2 (Saratov region), where the 121st Tu-160 Guards Regiment is stationed. From here, Tu-160s regularly fly out for missile strikes over Ukraine.

Role in Russia’s strategy

The Tu-160 is the pride of Russian strategic aviation. It is a supersonic missile carrier capable of flying thousands of kilometers with a large number of weapons. It is part of the Russian nuclear triad as a key element of the air component. Its task is to launch a sudden massive strike against the enemy without entering its airspace.

Each lost Tu-160 is a blow to Russia’s long-term strategic deterrence potential. New production of such machines is a complex, multi-year process (6-8 years), and resources for it are limited under sanctions. A Ukrainian attack on such targets is not just a tactical, but a strategic success in the deep rear of Russia.

Figures and conclusions: a strategic strike on Russia’s future

Type of aircraftNumber in service (2024)
Tu-95MS47
Tu-16020
Tu-22M357
А-5021

This data is based on open sources, including Wikipedia, which aggregates information from various authoritative sources.

Thus, at the time of the attack, Russia had approximately 145 aircraft of the four models listed by the SBU. Based on this data and believing the SBU’s information, Ukraine was hit by 28% of the total number.

It is worth noting that the SBU may have more accurate data than those in open sources. Therefore, Malyuk’s figure of 34% of the affected strategic cruise missile carriers may be true.

In any case, we are talking about about a third of the capacity.

The SBU operation to destroy the aircraft on June 1 is not just a symbolic action, but a real military and economic shock for Russia. If it is confirmed that more than 40 pieces of strategic equipment were destroyed, this could have long-term consequences for Russia’s ability to wage war from the air.

Most of the destroyed machines are extremely expensive aircraft that Russia cannot replace quickly.

Some of them are no longer in production or require imported parts, including from Ukraine.

Even if Russia is able to repair some of the damaged aircraft, it will take years and billions of dollars.

The extent of the losses will have to be proven by satellite images, as well as the Kremlin’s reaction. But it is already clear that Russia’s air superiority no longer looks unassailable. It is also clear that the Ukrainian special operation will go down in the textbooks.

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Остафійчук Ярослав
Editor

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