From “pre-trial settlement” to legal guarantees: what exactly does the BEB offer and where is the line between reform and substitution?
19 January 18:23
The Economic Security Bureau’s announcement of a public discussion on the mechanism of so-called “pre-trial settlement” of economic, primarily tax, offenses has already sparked a lively reaction in the legal and business communities.
On the one hand, the idea promises faster compensation for damages and fewer protracted criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, it raises doubts: is this a genuine European model with clear guarantees, or a simplified procedure that could replace justice? Where is the line between necessary reform and dangerous legal construction?
A correspondent from [Komersant] discussed this with Vyacheslav Trunov, a distinguished lawyer of Ukraine, honorary employee of the prosecutor’s office, expert in the field of business protection and law enforcement, who systematically analyzes the work of the BEB.
Initiative is good. But without results, it is not reform
Correspondent. Let’s start with the main thing. The BEB has announced a public discussion of “pre-trial settlement” of economic crimes. How do you assess this initiative — as a breakthrough or as a risk
Vyacheslav. There are two layers to this initiative — communication and legal.
In terms of communication, it is presented as the right message: fast, effective, without delays, with a focus on compensation. But from a legal point of view, what matters is not how the slogan sounds, but how the mechanism is constructed: who makes the decisions, according to what criteria, what safeguards are in place against abuse, what controls are in place, what happens to the liability of individuals.
I am not against modernization. But I am against a situation where a “new mechanism” is proposed without an honest answer to the first question: why does the current mechanism in the BEB give such poor results and where exactly is the “bottleneck” in the system?
Before building something new, evaluate how the current one works.
Correspondent: You have emphasized several times that we must first deal with the old model. What exactly in the current work of the BEB, in your opinion, needs to be assessed first?
Vyacheslav. First of all, full-cycle performance. Because when an agency talks about new procedures, society has the right to ask: what about the basic indicators and basic functions?
There are at least two things that cannot be ignored.
The first is how many cases actually reach court. If the percentage is low, it means there are problems with evidence, case management, procedural discipline, or interaction with the prosecutor as the procedural supervisor.
The second is what happens in and after court. Because “referring” does not mean “proving.” We need a picture: verdicts, closures, acquittals, settlements, enforcement of decisions, and actual compensation.
Without this, any discussion of a “new mechanism” will inevitably be detached from the real state of affairs.
Correspondent. Then let’s get specific. What figures are you talking about? What alarms you about the BEB’s indicators?
Vyacheslav. I am concerned about the systematic low percentage of cases that the BEB brings to court — and this is evident from the official statistics.
In 2023, only about 7.5% of all cases handled by the BEB were sent to court. In other words, only one in every 13 cases actually reaches court.
In 2024, the situation was not much better: there were 6,805 criminal proceedings under investigation by the BEB detectives, and only 681 were referred to court. That is approximately 10%, or one in ten.
And fundamentally important: according to these parameters, this looks like the worst indicator among the bodies conducting pre-trial investigations. This is an extremely negative signal, as it indicates either systemic failures in the quality of investigation/evidence gathering, or management problems, or procedural distortions — and all of this must be honestly diagnosed before proposing “new mechanisms” instead of improving the basic function of the agency.
Openness is not a slogan, but data
Correspondent: You talk about the need for a complete picture. Where do you think the new leader should start — and what can still be done now?
Vyacheslav. I believe that it was necessary to start — and it is not too late to start — by laying all the cards on the table. That is, with the most complete, professional, public assessment: where exactly is the BEB as an institution and how does it perform its designated functions?
Because managing any system starts with something simple: to move forward, you need to know your starting point. And if we are talking about the Bureau of Economic Security, then the starting point is not just “criminal proceedings.”
It is the entire cycle from A to Z:
- identifying economic security risks: which key risks really dominate, how the BEB identifies them, what data sources it uses, which sectors are a priority;
- risk assessment: how the risk profile is formed, how “systemic risks” differ from “isolated violations,” what the prioritization criteria are;
- and — fundamentally — risk minimization and elimination: what exactly does the BEB do as a result of its activities to reduce risks to economic security, rather than simply recording them in reports or presentations.
Next comes the classic law enforcement block:
- quality of registration and support of proceedings;
- evidence base, suspicion, procedural guidance by the prosecutor;
- referral to court;
- court outcomes — verdicts/dismissals/acquittals/plea bargains;
- enforcement of court decisions, actual collection, actual compensation.
So far, we have mainly heard about intentions and initiatives. But we have not seen a complete, publicly presented professional diagnosis — where we are and what exactly needs to be corrected. Without this, any new procedure — even if it sounds progressive — will be detached from reality.
Correspondent. You say, “show your cards.” But the BEB leadership talks about openness and transparency. What exactly do you mean by “showing your cards” in practice?
Vyacheslav. I am talking about practice. Openness is not a style of communication or the number of public events. Openness is, first and foremost, the regularity and completeness of data that allows society and the professional community to evaluate an institution based on facts.
And here is a very telling moment. For the first time in the last three years, despite the new leadership’s repeated proclamations of openness, we did not see the BE’s annual report for the previous year in early January. In previous years, such reports were published at the beginning of January. This may be a minor detail for the information field, but it is not a minor detail for institutional culture. This is an example of how proclaiming and implementing are two different things.
Therefore, in my opinion, before designing new mechanisms, the BEB must learn to flawlessly implement existing ones — both in terms of transparency and procedural discipline. It needs to establish simple, basic enforcement of the law: starting with the legality of registering criminal offenses, prompt, complete, comprehensive, and objective investigations, and ending with the referral of materials to the court and monitoring the enforcement of sentences and actual compensation.
So far, we have not seen this to the extent that society has a right to expect. That is why I believe that the time for announcements and slogans should be over. It is time for routine, difficult, but professional work — with results that can be measured and verified.
Many initiatives and high activity — but this is not an end in itself
Correspondent. Against this backdrop, it is all the more interesting that the new team is actively presenting various initiatives. To summarize: what specific areas have we heard about from Oleksandr Tsivinsky over the past few months? And which of them do you consider to be key?
Vyacheslav. If we compile a “portfolio” of publicly announced areas, it is indeed broad.
First, there is the concept of the “Economic Shield” as a framework for analysis, prevention, and risk management; there is also the idea of indicators/measures of economic security by region in order to prioritize the attention of the BEH.
Second, there is a large block of “trust”: a plan to increase trust in the BEB, a change in the tone of interaction with business, regular meetings with the business community, and public rhetoric about moving away from punitive measures. Alongside this is the topic of updating KPIs — that is, the agency should be evaluated differently.
Third, the internal management block: statements about auditing proceedings, “reviewing the legacy,” personnel decisions, internal integrity policy, “zero tolerance” for corruption within the agency.
Fourth, the external contour — and here we must say directly: the new head is very active. This includes constant international contacts, working meetings with partners, participation in business forums, public discussions, communication events, interviews, publications, signing of memoranda and framework agreements. The intensity of public and international activity gives the impression that there has been a lot of it in a short period of time — perhaps more than we are used to seeing in previous years.
But the key point is that such activity is not an end in itself. It only has value when it translates into concrete internal results: standards, methodologies, “before/after” figures, better quality investigations, predictability, and compensation.
And finally, the current central initiative: public discussion of “pre-trial settlement” in tax offenses.
But I want to focus on one example in particular — the “financial investigation institute.” It is indicative.
The Institute of Financial Investigations as a test of true novelty
Correspondent. Why is this topic so indicative for you?
Vyacheslav. Because in public explanations, it sounds like this: a financial investigation is not only about “finding the guilty and bringing them to justice,” but also about identifying losses, ensuring compensation, finding assets, including abroad, imposing seizures, and returning funds.
It sounds right. But I will say it gently and professionally: this is not a novelty. These are the basic duties of a pre-trial investigation in economic cases. Even a first-year student knows that an investigation is not just about “suspicion and indictment,” but also about identifying damages, ensuring compensation, seizing property, and recovering assets. If there is an international element, it involves international legal assistance, cooperation with foreign jurisdictions, and the search for and freezing of assets.
Therefore, the question is not about a nice name. The question is whether there is real institutional change behind it: training, methodologies, analytical tools, discipline of evidence, quality of materials, procedural culture, results in courts, and enforcement of decisions.
And here we return to the main point: vigorous activity and a set of initiatives do not yet constitute results. For now, society and business see primarily initiatives.
Pre-trial settlement: European content or Ukrainian substitution
Correspondent: Supporters of the initiative say that courts take years, business and the state are wasting time, and funds need to be returned more quickly. It sounds logical. Where do you see the trap?
Vyacheslav. The catch is that “faster” should not mean “easier at the expense of guarantees.”
In the public discussion, the logic goes something like this: the entity admits liability, compensates for the damage, pays an additional contribution — tentatively called 50% — and the proceedings are closed without suspicion. This is where the key risk arises: it may look like an “alternative,” but in practice, it can turn into a “pay and the proceedings disappear” model.
The European models referred to work differently. There, guarantees are built in constructively: initiation by the prosecutor, mandatory control, transparency, compliance conditions, judicial approval. In other words, they do not circumvent justice — they speed it up, but do not destroy safeguards.
France and CJIP: what it really is
Correspondent. Tsivinsky refers to the French CJIP. Explain “in essence”: what is this mechanism and why do you say that it is not a “pre-trial closure”?
Vyacheslav. CJIP in France is not an “agreement without a trial.” It is a court-controlled settlement procedure with very important features.
First: it is a mechanism for legal entities. It was not created as a universal “tool for everyone,” and this is fundamental.
Second, the initiator and bearer of responsibility is the prosecutor, who sets the terms of the settlement. In other words, the decision is not an “internal decision of the authority”; it has a procedural entity that bears responsibility.
Third, CJIP only makes sense when there is judicial approval. The court verifies that the conditions are proportionate and in the interests of justice. And then there is publicity, obligations, including compliance programs and enforcement monitoring.
Therefore, when we talk about “pre-trial settlement” as “closure without suspicion and without judicial control,” this is a different construct. This is not CJIP. It is a legal design that requires either strict guarantees or it is dangerous.
Correspondent. What about individuals? If a company has “settled,” does that mean that management or beneficiaries are automatically off the hook?
Vyacheslav. In European logic — no. And this is one of the reasons why CJIP does not turn into a “buyout.”
CJIP concerns the corporate liability of a legal entity. But if individuals have committed criminal acts, personal criminal liability does not disappear. There are two tracks: the company fulfills its corporate obligations (fine/compensation/compliance), and individuals are personally liable if a crime has been committed.
50% to the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a condition for closure: why this is legally toxic
Correspondent. A separate discussion is the “additional contribution” that is proposed to be directed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On a moral level, this is a strong argument. Why do you insist that this is legally unacceptable?
Vyacheslav. Because the law does not work like an emotional poster.
First — the principle of legality. Any payment that becomes a condition of a procedural decision by the state cannot exist “as a concept.” It must be prescribed by law: the subject, formula, procedure, control, appeal, transparency. Otherwise, the “contribution” ceases to be voluntary and becomes an element of procedural pressure.
The second is the budgetary and legal aspect. “Direct to the Armed Forces” is not a slogan, it is a budgetary procedure. If the law enforcement mechanism creates a “payment channel” for decisions to close proceedings, we get a parallel financing system that provokes abuse.
The third is criminal procedural logic. There are clear grounds for closing proceedings. If a model is proposed whereby “you pay compensation, you pay from above, and they close the case without suspicion,” this is effectively the creation of a new institution. And it can only be created in such a way that it is not a “legalization of bribery” but a mechanism for controlled settlement with guarantees and transparency.
And fourth, practical: without judicial control, such a structure will almost inevitably give rise to suspicions of selectivity. And selectivity is a direct path to a loss of trust, which they supposedly want to increase.
What to do: a sequence of steps if the state really wants a European model
Correspondent: In short, are you against this idea or in favor of a different design?
Vyacheslav. I am in favor of moving towards modern tools, but in the right sequence.
First, open data and professional diagnostics throughout the entire cycle: risks → assessment → minimization → investigation → court → enforcement. Until this happens, we are reforming presentations, not reality.
Second, reporting. If an authority claims to be trustworthy, it must be as predictable as possible in its reporting. And when reports were published at the beginning of January for three years in a row, and now the public does not see them, this needs to be explained and corrected. Trust begins with facts.
Third, if we implement the “European model,” then in essence: the sphere — primarily legal entities; initiation and responsibility — the prosecutor; compliance and enforcement control; judicial control as a guarantee; and a clear distinction: settlement for a company does not mean immunity for individuals.
And it is imperative to remove legally toxic elements such as “50% as a condition for closure” from the structure without a transparent legal design.
Conclusion: Reform is not about slogans, but measurable results
Correspondent: How would you summarize this discussion in one sentence?
Vyacheslav. Very simply: any new mechanism is only possible after an honest assessment of the current one and with guarantees that prevent “settlement” from becoming legalized extortion. Otherwise, we will not increase trust — we will lose it completely.
