From “pre-trial settlement” to legal safeguards: what exactly is the BEB proposing, and where is the line between reform and subversion?
19 January 18:23
ІНТЕРВ'Ю
The public discussion of the mechanism for the so-called “pre-trial settlement” of economic offenses—primarily tax-related ones—announced by the Economic Security Bureau has already sparked a lively reaction in legal and business circles.
On the one hand, the idea promises faster compensation for damages and fewer protracted criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, it raises doubts: is this a genuine European model with clear guarantees, or a simplified procedure capable of undermining justice? Where does the line lie between necessary reform and a dangerous legal construct?
A "Komersant Ukrainian" correspondent discussed this with Vyacheslav Trunov—a distinguished lawyer of Ukraine, an honorary employee of the prosecutor’s office, and an expert in business protection and the organization of law enforcement agencies, who systematically analyzes the work of the BEB.
Initiative is good. But without results, it’s not reform
Reporter: Let’s start with the main point. The BEB has announced a public discussion on “pre-trial settlement” of economic crimes. How do you assess this initiative—as a breakthrough or as a risk?
Vyacheslav. This initiative has two layers—communication and legal.
From a communication standpoint, it is presented as the right message: fast, effective, without delays, with a focus on restitution. But from a legal standpoint, what matters is not how the slogan sounds, but how the mechanism is actually designed: who makes the decisions, based on what criteria, what safeguards against abuse are in place, what oversight exists, and what happens regarding the liability of individuals.
I am not opposed to modernization. But I am opposed to a situation where a “new mechanism” is proposed without an honest answer to the first question: why does the current mechanism at the BEB yield such poor results, and where exactly is the system’s “bottleneck”?
Before building something new—assess how the current one works
Correspondent. You’ve emphasized several times: first, we need to sort out the old model. What exactly in the BEB’s current operations, in your opinion, requires priority assessment?
Vyacheslav. First and foremost—effectiveness across the entire cycle. Because when an agency talks about new procedures, the public has the right to ask: what about the basic metrics and core functions?
There are at least two things that cannot be ignored.
First—how many cases actually make it to court. If the percentage is low, it means there are problems with either the evidence, case management, procedural discipline, or coordination with the prosecutor as the lead investigator.
Second—what happens in court and after the trial. Because “referring” a case does not necessarily mean “proving” it. We need the full picture: verdicts, dismissals, acquittals, plea agreements, enforcement of decisions, and actual compensation.
Without this, any discussion of a “new mechanism” will inevitably be detached from the actual state of affairs.
Correspondent. Then let’s get down to specifics. What figures are you referring to? What concerns you about the BEB’s metrics?
Vyacheslav. What is concerning is the consistent low percentage of cases that the BEB brings to court—and this is evident from official statistics.
In 2023, of all the cases handled by the BEB, only about 7.5% were sent to court. That is, in fact, only one in 13 cases reaches court.
In 2024, the situation was not much better: there were 6,805 criminal cases under investigation by BEB detectives, and only 681 were sent to court. That is approximately 10%, or one in ten.
And this is fundamentally important: by these metrics, it appears to be the worst performance among agencies conducting pre-trial investigations. This is an extremely negative signal, as it indicates either systemic failures in the quality of investigations or evidence gathering, or management issues, or procedural distortions—and all of this must be honestly diagnosed before proposing “new mechanisms” instead of fixing the agency’s core functions.
Transparency is not a slogan, but data
Correspondent. You speak of the need for a complete picture. Where, in your opinion, should the new head have started—and what is not too late to do now?
Vyacheslav. I believe that one should have started—and it is not too late to start—by laying all cards on the table. That is, with the most comprehensive, professional, and public assessment: exactly where the BEB stands as an institution and how it performs the functions assigned to it.
Because managing any system starts with the basics: to move forward, you need to know the starting point. And if we’re talking about the Bureau of Economic Security, the starting point isn’t just “criminal proceedings.”
It is the entire cycle from A to Z:
- identifying economic security risks: which key risks actually dominate, how the EBS identifies them, what data sources it uses, and which sectors are prioritized;
- risk assessment: how the risk profile is formed, how “systemic risks” differ from “isolated violations,” what the prioritization criteria are;
- and—fundamentally—risk minimization and mitigation: what exactly the Economic Security Bureau does as a result of its activities to ensure that risks to economic security are reduced, rather than merely recorded in reports or presentations.
Next comes the classic law enforcement component:
- the quality of case registration and management;
- evidence base, suspicion, and the prosecutor’s procedural guidance;
- referral to court;
- court outcomes—convictions/dismissals/acquittals/plea agreements;
- enforcement of court decisions, actual collection, actual compensation.
So far, we’ve mostly heard about intentions and initiatives. But we don’t see a comprehensive, publicly presented professional assessment—where we stand and exactly what needs to be fixed. And without that, any new procedure—even if it sounds progressive—will be detached from reality.
Correspondent. You say, “lay your cards on the table.” But the BEB leadership talks about openness and transparency. What exactly do you mean by “laying your cards on the table” in practice?
Vyacheslav. I’m talking precisely about practice. Openness is not a communication style or the number of public events. Openness is, above all, the regularity and completeness of data that allow society and the professional community to evaluate the institution based on facts.
And here is a very telling point. For the first time in the last three years, despite the new leadership’s repeated proclamations of openness, we did not see the BEB’s annual report for the previous year in early January. In previous years, such reports were published precisely at the beginning of January. This may seem like a minor detail in the media landscape, but it is no minor detail for institutional culture. It is precisely an example of how declaring something and actually doing it are two different things.
Therefore, in my view, before devising new mechanisms, the BEB must learn to flawlessly implement the existing ones—both in terms of transparency and procedural discipline. To establish simple, basic enforcement of the law: starting with the lawful registration of criminal offenses, prompt, thorough, comprehensive, and objective investigations, and ending with the referral of cases to court, monitoring the enforcement of sentences, and actual restitution.
So far, we do not see this to the extent that society has a right to expect. That is precisely why I believe the time for announcements and slogans should be over. The time has come for routine, hard, but professional work—with results that can be measured and verified.
Many initiatives and high activity—but this is not an end in itself
Correspondent. Against this backdrop, it is all the more interesting that the new team is actively presenting various initiatives. If we break it down by points: what specific areas have we already heard about from Oleksandr Tsivinsky over the past few months? And which of them, in your opinion, are key?
Vyacheslav. If we compile a “portfolio” of publicly announced areas, it is indeed broad.
First, there is the “Economic Shield” concept as a framework for analytics, prevention, and risk management; this also includes the idea of economic security indicators/metrics by region to prioritize the BEB’s focus.
Second, there is a major “trust” component: a plan to boost trust in the BEB, a shift in the tone of engagement with the business community, regular meetings with the business sector, and public rhetoric about moving away from punitive measures. Closely related is the topic of updating KPIs—the argument being that the agency should be evaluated differently.
Third, the internal management component: announcements regarding audits of proceedings, a “review of the legacy,” personnel decisions, an internal integrity policy, and “zero tolerance” for internal corruption.
Fourth, the external sphere—and here we must be blunt: the new head is very active. This involves constant international contacts, working meetings with partners, participation in business forums and public discussions, communication events, interviews, publications, and the signing of memorandums and framework agreements. Given the intensity of public and international activity, one gets the impression that there has been a great deal of it in a short period—perhaps more than we are used to seeing in previous years.
But here’s the key point: such activity is not an end in itself. It has value only when it translates into concrete internal results: standards, methodologies, “before and after” metrics, improved investigation quality, predictability, and compensation.
And finally, the current central initiative: the public discussion of “pre-trial settlement” in tax offenses.
But I want to focus separately on one example—the “Institute of Financial Investigations.” It is illustrative.
The Institute of Financial Investigations as a test of true innovation
Correspondent. Why is this particular topic illustrative for you?
Vyacheslav. Because in public explanations, it sounds like this: a financial investigation is not just about “identifying the guilty parties and bringing them to justice,” but also about identifying losses, ensuring restitution, locating assets—including those abroad—seizing them, and recovering funds.
That sounds correct. But I’ll put it mildly and professionally: this is nothing new. These are the basic duties of a pre-trial investigation in economic cases. Even a first-year student knows that an investigation is not just about “suspicion and an indictment,” but also about determining the damage, ensuring its recovery, seizing property, and tracing assets. If there is an international element—international legal assistance, cooperation with foreign jurisdictions, tracing and freezing assets.
So the issue isn’t about a fancy name. The issue is whether there is real institutional change behind it: training, methodologies, analytical tools, the rules of evidence, the quality of materials, procedural culture, results in court, and the enforcement of decisions.
And here we return to the main point: vigorous activity and a set of initiatives do not yet constitute a result. For now, society and business see primarily the initiatives.
Pre-trial settlement: European substance or Ukrainian substitution
Correspondent. Supporters of the initiative say: courts take years, business and the state are wasting time, funds need to be recovered faster. It sounds logical. Where, in your opinion, is the trap?
Vyacheslav. The trap is that “faster” should not mean “easier at the expense of guarantees.”
In the public discussion, the logic goes something like this: the party admits liability, compensates for the damage, pays an additional fee—let’s say 50%—and the case is closed without charges. This is where the key risk arises: it may look like an “alternative,” but in practice, it could turn into a “pay up, and the case disappears” model.
The European models cited operate differently. There, safeguards are built in: initiation by a prosecutor, mandatory oversight, transparency, compliance conditions, and judicial approval. In other words, they do not circumvent justice—they expedite it, but do not eliminate safeguards.
France and the CJIP: What It Really Is
Correspondent. Tsivinsky refers to the French CJIP. Explain “in essence”: what kind of mechanism is this, and why do you say it is not a “pre-trial settlement”?
Vyacheslav. The CJIP in France is not a “settlement without a trial.” It is a court-supervised settlement procedure, and one with very important features.
First: it is a mechanism for legal entities. It was not created as a universal “tool for everyone,” and this is fundamental.
Second: the initiator and the party responsible is the prosecutor, who sets the terms of the settlement. In other words, the decision is not an “internal decision of the authority”; it has a procedural party who bears responsibility.
Third: CJIP only makes sense when there is judicial approval. The court verifies that the terms are proportionate and serve the interests of justice. And then there is transparency, obligations—including compliance programs—and monitoring of implementation.
Therefore, when people here refer to “pre-trial settlement” as “closure without suspicion and without judicial oversight”—that is a different construct. It is not CJIP. It is a legal framework that requires either strict safeguards or it is dangerous.
Correspondent. What about individuals? If a company “settles”—does that mean management or beneficiaries are automatically off the hook?
Vyacheslav. In European logic—no. And that’s one of the reasons why CJIP doesn’t turn into a “buyout.”
CJIP concerns the corporate liability of a legal entity. But if individuals committed criminal acts—personal criminal liability does not disappear. There are two tracks: the company fulfills its corporate obligations (fines/compensation/compliance), while individuals are held personally liable—if the elements of a crime are present.
50% for the Armed Forces as a condition for closure: why this is legally problematic
Correspondent. A separate discussion concerns the “additional contribution” proposed to be directed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On a moral level, this is a strong argument. Why do you insist that this is legally unacceptable?
Vyacheslav. Because the law does not function as an emotional slogan.
First—the principle of legality. Any payment that becomes a condition of a state’s procedural decision cannot exist “as a concept.” It must be prescribed by law: the entity, the formula, the procedure, oversight, appeals, transparency. Otherwise, the “contribution” ceases to be voluntary and becomes an element of procedural pressure.
Second—the budgetary-legal dimension. “Allocate to the Armed Forces” is not a slogan; it is a budgetary procedure. If a law enforcement mechanism creates a “payment channel” tied to a decision to close a case, we end up with a parallel funding system that invites abuse.
Third—criminal procedural logic. The closure of proceedings must have clear grounds. If the proposed model is “reimbursed, paid from above, closed without suspicion,” then this effectively creates a new institution. And it can only be created in such a way that it is not a “legalization of extortion,” but a mechanism for controlled settlement with guarantees and transparency.
And fourth—practical considerations: without judicial oversight, such a structure will almost inevitably raise suspicions of selectivity. And selectivity is a direct path to a loss of trust, which they supposedly want to increase.
What to do: a roadmap if the state truly wants a European model
Correspondent. In short: are you against this idea, or in favor of it provided a different design is adopted?
Vyacheslav. I am in favor of moving toward modern tools, but in the right sequence.
First, open data and professional diagnostics throughout the entire cycle: risks → assessment → minimization → investigation → court → enforcement. Until this is in place, we are reforming presentations, not reality.
Second, reporting. If an agency wants to earn trust, its reporting must be as predictable as possible. And when reports were published in early January for three years in a row, but now the public doesn’t see them—this needs to be explained and corrected. Trust starts with facts.
Third, if we are to implement the “European model,” then in essence: the scope—primarily legal entities; initiation and responsibility—the prosecutor; compliance and enforcement oversight; judicial oversight as a safeguard; and a clear distinction: regulation for a company does not mean immunity for individuals.
And it is essential to remove legally toxic elements from the framework, such as “50% as a condition for closure,” without a transparent legal design.
Conclusion: Reform is not about slogans, but measurable results
Correspondent. So how would you sum up this discussion in one sentence?
Vyacheslav. Very simply: any new mechanism is possible only after an honest assessment of the current one and provided there are safeguards that prevent “settlement” from becoming a legalized buyout. Otherwise, we won’t build trust—we’ll lose it for good.
