Iskander strike on the 168th Reserve Battalion: what happened, who is responsible and how to avoid repetition
6 March 2025 11:53
on March 1, at 15:20, a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile struck the location of the 168th Reserve Battalion of the East Operational Command in the Dnipro region. According to preliminary reports, up to 39 soldiers were killed and up to 90 wounded. This tragedy has once again raised questions about the organization of security for military units and the effectiveness of measures to counter air threats. On his Facebook page, military journalist Yuriy Butusov explained what happened, why there was a crowd of people and why heavy losses could not be avoided, "Komersant Ukrainian" reports
What is the 168th Reserve Battalion?
This is a military unit of the Army within the East operational command, whose task is to redeploy personnel from one military unit to another.
The battalion command is the permanent staff of the battalion, and most of the people are there temporarily, many hundreds of soldiers were there at the time of the attack.
“There is no combat training. The unit is a tent camp in the open near the 239th ground forces training ground, about 130-140 km from the front line. The tents are located close enough to be camouflaged from aerial observation, a significant number of tents are buried, but there are no dugouts, all tents are not protected from above, and the part of the camp where meetings and formations are held is also not protected. There was a large parking lot for dozens of cars near the camp. People were constantly arriving and leaving the unit, there was constant traffic,” Butusov said.
Why was there a crowd of people?
The presence of a large number of soldiers in this place is explained by the organization of transfers between units. As Butusov explains:
“The main way of transferring in the Ukrainian Defense Forces is a chaotic and poorly organized process by leaving the unit without permission. AWOL has ceased to be a criminal offense, so all those who for various reasons left the service earlier or are going to transfer without the consent of the unit command are transferred to the reserve battalion, there are many thousands of AWOLs.”
According to him, the reserve battalion received “buyers” every day – representatives of those units that are authorized to select people in the battalion.
“That’s why there were constant meetings and formations – people arrive, people are counted, people are gathered to talk to recruiters, people move on their own, people are sent away. There was constant traffic. It is extremely difficult to maintain order – people come temporarily, most of them are unmotivated and undisciplined, some stay in tents for several days, and some for two months, constant raids to check for illegal alcohol, sometimes fights, constant trips to the nearest settlements,” the journalist said.
Butusov noted that there is no military justice in Ukraine, so all discipline and order in the crowd is controlled by a small number of commanders, which is not enough for such circumstances.
“Military commanders at all levels constantly monitored the battalion’s activities and were aware of all the problems,” he added.
How is the air defense and air cover of the camp organized?
The Vostok Air Command is responsible for protecting the airspace in the Dnipro region.
Russian reconnaissance drones regularly appear in these areas, and enemy drones are often spotted flying overhead, observing Ukrainian military installations. This creates a constant threat of missile attacks, as evidenced by repeated reports of potential strikes.
Why did they fail to destroy the enemy drone?
According to military journalist Yuriy Butusov, on March 1, a Russian reconnaissance drone was spotted in Ukrainian airspace. The military tried to eliminate it, but all attempts were unsuccessful.
“But on March 1, a Russian drone was spotted and monitored, and attempts were made to destroy it, but they failed. This Russian drone was operating over the territory of Dnipropetrovs’k region for about 6 hours, but during this time it was not shot down,” Butusov said.
How did the drone point the Iskander at the camp?
According to Censor.Net’s sources, the 168th Reserve Battalion was not the main target for reconnaissance, but was included in the list of monitored objects. The critical factor was that the enemy spotted the formation and mass gathering of military in the camp, which was probably the decisive moment for the strike.
“At 15:07, the Vostok Air Command issued a warning about the threat of a missile strike. An enemy drone was also reported flying overhead, which turned out to be adjusting the missile strike,” Butusov said.
Why were heavy losses avoided?
Butusov notes that due to frequent drone overflights and warnings of a missile attack, most military units do not respond to them.
on March 1, a warning of a missile attack was issued at 15:07. However, according to the soldiers, the battalion’s work was not suspended, and people were not ordered to take cover.
“The soldiers who were on the territory of the 168th battalion during the attack told Censor.net that the unit worked as usual even during the warnings, and the movement of people was not restricted during the warnings, there were no commands to take shelter, no dispersal was carried out. Line-ups and meetings continued, i.e. normal work. Most of the people were in tents that were not protected from above, or were moving around the camp, some were at the assembly area. The Russian missile was equipped with a cluster warhead that covered a large area,” the journalist explained.
Who is responsible?
Orders regarding the safety of personnel are not always properly executed. According to Butusov:
“In the fourth year of the war, it is not possible to guarantee the safety of the troops and avoid large losses. The reason is basic irresponsibility on the part of the command at all levels. Orders are issued that are not controlled or contradict each other.”
The battalion commander, who has already been dismissed, is now responsible. However, there are questions to the entire command and control system.
“Orders are being issued that are not controlled or that contradict other tasks on which orders are also issued. “There should be questions to all those who managed and controlled the organization of the 168th Reserve Battalion, the Eastern Command, the Land Forces Command, the Eastern Command, and the Air Force Command. At the moment, the blame is being placed solely on the battalion commander, who has been dismissed from his post,” the journalist emphasizes.
How to avoid similar tragedies in the future?
According to military journalist Yuriy Butusov, in order to avoid such tragedies, we need to:
1. “Mass gatherings of people that cannot be disguised and their daily activities organized covertly should be banned in areas where enemy drones are constantly flying in – that is, all training and reserve camps to accommodate thousands of people should be moved at least 400-500 km from the front line.
2. Coverage of the frontline areas should be strengthened with radar and Ukraine’s own interceptor drones to increase the sincerity and quality of enemy drone strikes. a 6-hour drone flight over our rear is unacceptable, and there are now enough means to intercept it.
3. The location of troop concentrations in the frontline area must be provided with shelters, and troops must be dispersed to avoid mass gatherings, especially if they are repeated in the same place.
4. Interaction between ground and air forces regarding drone warnings and the organization of people’s safety should be the first tasks of commanders and officers at all levels. The leadership of the Armed Forces should introduce an after-action review procedure to quickly identify the causes of significant personnel losses outside of criminal proceedings and quickly make changes to the organization of the service. Because over the three years of war, attacks on deployment points have been carried out constantly, dozens of times resulting in casualties, several times in large numbers, and we need to start drawing systematic conclusions and prevent large simultaneous losses, and this can be achieved by basic measures.
5. Not only immediate commanders should be held accountable for violations of requirements and orders on personnel safety, but first and foremost commanders and commanders responsible for organizing and controlling the activities of military units.
It should be noted that the SBI opened a criminal investigation into the tragedy under Part 4 of Article 425 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (negligent attitude to military service committed under martial law or in a combat situation). It is not yet known which of the unit commanders or the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is involved.
Procedural guidance is provided by the Office of the Prosecutor General.
