Corruption is on the run: a new strategy is coming
COLUMN
Ukraine is developing a new Anti-Corruption Strategy — through 2030.
Such a document is necessary in and of itself. But we shouldn’t start by presenting new goals; instead, we should begin with an honest question: what did the previous strategy for 2021–2025 actually achieve?
After all, we did have one. It was preceded by a state program. There were responsible agencies, deadlines, indicators, and monitoring.
And now the government is once again presenting society with a major document covering several years ahead.
Fine. But first, it’s worth looking back.
The previous Anti-Corruption Strategy was adopted late—as late as 2022, even though it formally covered the period starting in 2021. The state anti-corruption program to implement it appeared even later—in 2023.
In other words, we spent a significant amount of time not even on results, but on getting the system up and running.
Now for the numbers.
According to official monitoring of the implementation of the State Anti-Corruption Program, 550 out of 998 measures have been fully implemented. Another 217 have been partially implemented. 231 have not been implemented.
In total, 767 measures have been fully or partially implemented, or 76.9%.
At first glance, that’s not bad.
But when you remove the convenient “fully or partially” label, the picture becomes less optimistic. Just over half have been fully implemented. Nearly a quarter of the measures remain unimplemented.
And this is no longer a technical detail. It is a matter of accountability.
Because “partially implemented” may sound decent on paper. But for a person facing corruption in court, at customs, with the tax authorities, in procurement, or when dealing with law enforcement, it means almost nothing.
This is where the main disconnect lies.
The strategy lives its own life. Corruption lives its own.
You can write the right things on paper. But life is measured not by the number of items in the program, but by whether there is less fear, dependence, and “getting things done” through the right people.
Let’s look not at impressions, but at results.
In 2021, Ukraine scored 32 out of 100 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2025, it scored 36.
Yes, this is progress. But four points over five years is not a breakthrough. Especially since Ukraine already had those same 36 points in 2023, dropped to 35 in 2024, and returned to 36 in 2025.
This looks less like a sharp turnaround and more like a slow fluctuation around that same problematic threshold.
There is another figure—one closer to people’s perceptions. According to Gallup, in 2025, 85% of Ukrainians believed that corruption was widespread in government.
Not “somewhere out there.” Not “in isolated cases.” But as a widespread phenomenon.
After that, it is difficult to convince society that the problem is merely that we lack yet another strategic document.
During the previous strategy’s implementation, the country witnessed the case of the Supreme Court chief justice suspected of accepting a $2.7 million bribe. It saw scandals in defense procurement. It witnessed Operation “Midas”—according to the NABU and SAPO, a story about a high-level criminal organization in the energy sector, particularly surrounding “Energoatom.”
Every case, of course, must go to trial. That is fundamental.
But the political and social conclusion is already clear: the problem is not that Ukraine doesn’t know how to draft anti-corruption strategies. It does. Sometimes even very well.
The problem lies elsewhere.
It is far too easy here to fail to fulfill previous promises—and immediately move on to drafting new ones.
The story of Bill No. 12414, which became Law No. 4555-IX after its adoption, is particularly telling.
It was this very bill that sparked a sharp reaction in July 2025, as it was perceived as a blow to the autonomy of NABU and SAPO. Following protests and criticism from international partners, the situation had to be effectively reversed.
And here, the important issue is not even just NABU or the SAPO themselves.
The story surrounding this law demonstrated the main point: a strategy does not constrain political decisions if they are made outside its logic.
This did not appear to be the result of an honest audit of the anti-corruption system, nor was it the outcome of a broad professional discussion. On the contrary—the public saw an attempt to quickly shift the balance of power around key anti-corruption agencies after the state had for years declared their independence as part of its anti-corruption policy.
That is precisely where the absurdity lies.
With one hand, the state drafts an anti-corruption strategy. With the other, it makes decisions that undermine anti-corruption institutions.
And when society takes to the streets in protest, when international partners react, when it becomes clear that this threatens trust in Ukraine, then everything is quickly fixed.
But then what is the strategy for?
If key decisions in the anti-corruption sphere can be made outside its logic, contrary to its spirit, and without a serious explanation to the public, it turns into a pretty decoration.
The document is about strengthening institutions.
Political practice is about an attempt to bring them under control.
Before the new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2030, the public has the right to demand an honest audit of the old one.
Not a general report in the style of “work is ongoing.”
But a concrete answer: what has been accomplished, what has failed, why it happened, which problems have simply been carried over into the new document, and whether anyone has been held accountable for the failures.
Without this, the new strategy risks becoming not a tool for fighting corruption, but a way to neatly sweep old failures under the rug.
Anti-corruption policy should not be a literary genre.
It must answer a simple question: after all the strategies, programs, and monitoring, has it become scarier for corrupt officials, and safer for citizens and businesses?
So far, the honest answer is unpleasant: there are more documents, but no results.
This is precisely where we need to start the conversation about a new strategy for 2030.
