Before asking for even more authority, NABU must provide the public with comprehensive statistics on the duration of its investigations
8 May 18:06
An interview on legislative initiatives by NABU and SAPO, judicial oversight, the duration of pre-trial investigations, and the risks of political influence on law enforcement agencies
Recent reports of possible amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the powers of NABU and SAPO have sparked serious debate among legal professionals. These are not merely technical changes. Some of the proposals could significantly alter the balance between the prosecution, judicial oversight, and human rights. The "Komersant Ukrainian" editorial team spoke with Vyacheslav Trunov— a distinguished lawyer of Ukraine, an honorary employee of the prosecutor’s office, and an expert in business protection—about the risks of such changes.
– Mr. Trunov, why is this topic important at all? For many people, NABU is the agency that fights high-level corruption. It would seem that the more powers it has, the better.
– The fight against corruption is indeed important. There is no debate about that. But a state governed by the rule of law differs from one that is not not by the loudness of its slogans or the harshness of its law enforcement agencies.
It is distinguished by the fact that even the most dangerous crimes are investigated according to the rules—with judicial oversight, time limits, the presumption of innocence, and the state’s responsibility for the quality of the prosecution.
Corrupt officials must be held accountable. But the state must prove their guilt in court, not createa separate procedural regime for itself where oversight is weaker, deadlines are longer, and public condemnation often precedes a court verdict.
NABU already has a very strong status today. By law, it is a central executive body with special status that deals with the prevention, detection, suppression, investigation, and resolution of corruption and other criminal offenses falling under its jurisdiction.
Add to this the SAPO as a specialized prosecutor’s office and the HACC as a specialized anti-corruption court. In other words, a separate anti-corruption vertical has already been established in Ukraine: a special investigative body, a specialized prosecutorial unit, and a specialized court.
There is no single universal model for an anti-corruption body in the world. International practice recognizes various structures: multifunctional agencies, specialized law enforcement units, and preventive and coordinating institutions. But the Ukrainian model is already highly concentrated today: a separate investigative body, a separate anti-corruption prosecutor’s office, and a separate anti-corruption court.
Therefore, when such a system asks for even more powers, we must look not only at the slogan “fight against corruption,” but also at the safeguards. The independence of an agency is not a right to be unaccountable.
– Where exactly do you see the main risk in the proposed changes?
– The most dangerous idea is to weaken or effectively remove judicial oversight of the time limits for pre-trial investigations.
Judicial oversight of time limits is not a bureaucratic obstacle to the investigation. It is a guarantee that a person will not remain a suspect for years without an independent assessment: whether the case is truly complex, whether the investigation is actually progressing, or whether the criminal proceedings are turning into a tool of pressure.
If the prosecutor extends the deadlines on their own, and the court steps aside, the balance shifts. The prosecution gains the ability to assess its own effectiveness and its own timelines.
This is a flawed structure for criminal proceedings.
– But corruption cases are often truly complex. They involve many episodes, expert analyses, and international legal assistance.
– Yes, that’s true. And we have to admit that honestly.
NABU cases can be complex: financial flows, beneficiaries, offshore structures, international requests, expert analyses, and many participants. But the complexity of a case does not negate the need for judicial oversight.
On the contrary, the more complex the case and the greater its political resonance, the stronger the procedural safeguards must be. The question is not whether the investigation should be given time. The question is who checks—and how—that this time is being used properly.
– Are there any democratic countries in the world where there is absolutely no judicial oversight of the time limits or duration of criminal proceedings?
– In its purest form—I don’t see any such examples among established democracies.
The models vary.
- In Spain, investigations have time limits, and extensions require a reasoned decision.
- In Italy , if an investigation is complex, the prosecutor asks a judge to extend the time limit.
- In France , the preliminary investigation has a time limit, which can be extended by a written and reasoned decision of the prosecutor, but this is not a model of indefinite duration.
- In Germany, there is no exact Ukrainian equivalent of a pre-trial investigation time limit, but there is very strict judicial oversight regarding restrictions on liberty. For example, detention for more than six months is possible only by a special decision of the higher regional court, and subsequent reviews must be conducted no later than every three months.
- In the U.S., oversight operates through different mechanisms: under the Speedy Trial Act, a trial in federal criminal cases must begin within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or the defendant’s first court appearance, whichever comes later.
In other words, the technical models differ. But the philosophy is the same: the state cannot criminally prosecute a person without effective external oversight.
Simply put, a democratic system does not allow the investigation to act as the arbiter of its own duration.
– You mentioned NABU’s statistics. What do they show?
– There are two sides to the statistics. On the one hand, NABU and the SAPO are showing increased activity. Reports from recent years show an increase in the number of suspicions, indictments, and court outcomes.
On the other hand, when we look not at press releases but at the entire pipeline, the picture becomes less optimistic.
According to our calculations based on public reports, NABU and SAPO initiated approximately 3,928 criminal proceedings or investigations between 2020 and 2025. During this period, 527 indictments were sent to court.
That is, the proportion of cases referred to court is approximately 13.4%.
In other words, if we look very roughly at the annual flow, for every 100 cases initiated, about 13–14 indictments reach the court.
Of course, this figure should not be interpreted simplistically. A case registered in one year may be referred to court in another. Corruption cases are indeed complex. They may involve expert analyses, international legal assistance, financial transactions, numerous incidents, and many individuals.
But the question remains: can the system be called sufficiently effective if, with such broad powers, only about 13.4% of the total caseload over six years reaches court?
This is not an answer, but a question for public discussion. But without this figure, the discussion will be incomplete.
– What about the verdicts?
– Here, too, we need to look not only at absolute numbers but also at percentages. As of the end of 2025, according to official summary data, NABU/SAPO had 751 indictments sent to court and 301 guilty verdicts.
That is, the ratio of convictions to indictments is approximately 40.1%.
Again, this does not mean that the remaining cases are “lost.” Some are still being heard, some are under appeal, and some are not yet concluded. But for the public, this is a very important indicator: there is a significant time and procedural gap between the high-profile announcement of a case and the final judicial outcome.
To put it simply: a relatively small portion of cases reaches the court, and an even smaller portion of the entire pipeline concludes with a verdict. And it is against this backdrop that NABU/SAPO are asking for even more procedural freedom and less judicial oversight.
– What do the High Anti-Corruption Court’s statistics for 2025 look like?
– In 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) reviewed 114 criminal cases involving 180 individuals. Of these, 154 were convicted, 8 were acquitted, proceedings against 16 were closed, and the indictment against 2 was returned to the prosecutor.
In percentages, this looks like this:154 convicted out of 180 individuals—that is approximately 85.6%; 8 acquitted—4.4%; 16 individuals for whom proceedings were closed—8.9%; 2 individuals for whom the indictment was returned to the prosecutor—1.1%.
At first glance, 85.6% of those convicted among completed cases is a high figure. But we need to look further: what exactly does “convicted” mean?
According to High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) rulings that became final in 2025, 133 individuals were convicted.
Of these, 25 individuals received actual imprisonment—approximately 18.8%; 97 individuals were released from serving their sentences on probation—72.9%; 7 individuals were fined—5.3%; and 4 individuals received other forms of exemption from punishment—about 3%.
This raises a very simple question: how should society assess the effectiveness of the anti-corruption system if less than 20% of those convicted receive actual prison sentences under final judgments?
This does not mean that every case must end in prison. Criminal law does not operate on the principle of “lock everyone up.” But when society is shown high-profile allegations, searches, wiretaps, presentations of schemes, and high-profile operations for years on end, people have the right to know the final outcome: the percentage of cases concluded with convictions, the stability of these convictions on appeal, the actual structure of penalties, and the actual return of assets to the state.
Because a press release is not justice.
A suspicion is not a verdict.
An indictment is not proven guilt.
And even a verdict does not always mean actual punishment.
– You say that the main problem lies not only in the numbers that are available, but also in the numbers that are missing. What exactly do you mean?
– This is the key point. Before asking to remove or weaken judicial oversight of time limits, NABU and SAPO should present the public with complete statistics on these time limits.
First and foremost—the structure of investigation durations: the proportion of cases lasting more than one year, two years, three years, or five years. Separately—the average and median time from entry into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations to notification of suspicion, as well as from suspicion to the indictment.
Equally important are the statistics on judicial oversight: the number of requests for deadline extensions, the proportion of granted and denied motions, typical reasons for denials, and the proportion of cases closed specifically due to time limits. Without this data, claims that “the court is getting in the way” or that “time limits should be abolished” lack evidence.
– But there was an independent audit of NABU. What did it reveal in this regard?
– And here is a very important point. The materials of the external independent assessment of NABU’s activities are published on the Cabinet of Ministers’ website. This is not a private opinion, but an officially conducted external assessment of effectiveness.
The final report explicitly states: quantitative indicators used to measure NABU’s effectiveness can only be interpreted as supplementary and in relation to qualitative indicators. And here’s what’s even more important: NABU does not maintain its own statistics on motions, while the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) tracks the statistics on motions from all investigative bodies within its jurisdiction, but does not separately record the number of motions filed specifically by NABU detectives or the outcomes of their review.
This is fundamental.
How can one ask to change the rules of judicial oversight if even the complete statistics on NABU’s applications to the court are not publicly disclosed: the structure of the motions, the proportion of those granted and denied, the grounds for denial, and the categories of cases in which problems arise?
We hear a lot about the independence of anti-corruption agencies. But we hear much less about their statistical transparency.
And this is precisely what the heads of anti-corruption institutions hardly ever discuss. They often speak of the complexity of cases, of the public interest, and of the need for efficiency. But if the key complaint concerns deadlines and judicial oversight, then without complete statistics on deadlines, such a discussion seems incomplete.
– So you don’t dispute the complexity of NABU’s work, but you question the validity of legislative changes?
– Exactly.
If the problem lies in expert analyses, then the problem with expert analyses must be addressed. If the bottleneck is in international legal assistance, we need to strengthen that area. If there aren’t enough investigators or analysts, we need to look at staffing, caseloads, and case management. If the defense is abusing procedural rights, we need targeted safeguards specifically against such abuses.
But we cannot simply go to parliament with the logic: “give us less judicial oversight.” That is too crude a response to a complex problem.
– Supporters of the changes might say: if judicial oversight is maintained, high-profile corruption cases will continue to be dismissed due to the statute of limitations.
– Some cases may indeed be closed due to the statute of limitations. According to the High Anti-Corruption Court’s statistics for 2025, among the completed cases, there are proceedings that were closed; in total, proceedings were closed for 16 out of 180 individuals, or approximately 8.9%.
But this does not mean that judicial oversight should be dismantled.
Each such case requires a separate analysis: was there an objective complexity to the case, how did the defense act, were the expert examinations delayed, did international legal assistance work, how did the prosecutor and investigator manage the proceedings, and were there procedural errors on the part of the prosecution.
Without answers to these questions, the abolition of judicial oversight looks not like a reform, but like an attempt to remove an inconvenient safeguard.
– What is the role of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in this discussion? Can it be said that judicial oversight hinders the investigation?
– According to the High Anti-Corruption Court’s public statistics—no.
In 2025, the investigating judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court had a massive volume of pre-trial review materials: 11,583 motions, complaints, statements, and other materials. The review of 11,471 such materials was completed, or approximately 99%.
Looking specifically at motions: out of 10,184 motions, 10,088 were reviewed—also effectively 99%.
This does not look like paralysis. On the contrary, judicial oversight is operating under heavy workload and at a high pace.
Therefore, if NABU/SAPO claim that judicial oversight of deadlines is the root of the systemic problem, they must provide separate statistics specifically for these motions: the total number of motions filed, the outcomes of their review, the percentage of denials, and the reasons for such decisions.
Without this, the claim of an “obstacle” remains a political argument rather than evidence.
– A separate issue is the publication of pre-trial investigation materials. Why do you consider this a risk?
– Because NABU investigates political elites, big business, judges, and heads of state agencies. In such cases, any publication of materials prior to a verdict has a political impact.
Informing the public is normal. Reporting on suspicions, searches, asset freezes, or the facts of a case is acceptable if done correctly. But selectively releasing fragments of pre-trial investigation materials, audio recordings, transcripts, and “tapes” into the public sphere—which create the impression of guilt in the public before a court verdict—is a different story.
In established democracies, law enforcement agencies are very cautious about this. They understand that the presumption of innocence is not a mere formality. If the state creates a public image of a guilty person before a court decision, it influences not only their reputation but also the political process.
– Do you call this political influence by a law enforcement agency?
– I would phrase it cautiously. The mere fact that NABU is investigating a politician or high-ranking official does not imply political motivation. High-level corruption is, by its very nature, linked to politics.
But political influence arises when several factors are present simultaneously: very broad powers, weaker judicial oversight, lengthy proceedings, selective public disclosure of materials, and the absence of a swift judicial resolution.
In such cases, criminal proceedings can influence political careers, approval ratings, government decisions, personnel appointments, and business reputations— even before a verdict is reached.
This is dangerous not only for the suspects. It is dangerous for the state.
Law enforcement agencies must not become political communicators.
– What, then, should the state’s proper response be?
– Not in weakening safeguards.
The correct response is comprehensive statistics, high-quality procedural management, sufficient expert resources, faster international legal assistance, oversight of abuses on both sides, reasonable trial timelines, and very clear rules for public communication.
If NABU and SAPO want to change the rules regarding time limits, they must present themselves to the public not just with the claim “we are being hindered,” but with a comprehensive analytical table: the total number of cases, their duration, the structure of extensions, the percentage of court rejections, the reasons for such rejections, the number of cases actually lost due to time limits, and the answer to the key question—where exactly the delays occur: in the work of the investigation, the prosecution, expert examinations, international legal assistance, the court, or the defense.
Only then can we talk about legislative changes.
– What is your main conclusion regarding this initiative?
– NABU and SAPO must be independent. But independence does not mean lack of oversight.
The anti-corruption system must be strong. But the strength of a law enforcement agency in a state governed by the rule of law is measured not by the number of press releases or the scope of its powers, but by the quality of evidence, the consistency of verdicts, and adherence to procedural safeguards.
Judicial oversight of time limits is not an obstacle to anti-corruption. It is one of the safeguards against turning criminal proceedings into an indefinite tool of pressure.
Before asking for even more power, anti-corruption agencies must demonstrate greater transparency.
Especially regarding the duration of investigations.
If an agency has broad powers but does not provide complete statistics on time limits, extensions, dismissals, court outcomes, and the actual enforcement of sentences, then the answer cannot be even more powers.
- First—transparency.
- Then—an analysis of the causes.
- And only after that—legislative changes.
Because if the state allows investigations to be conducted over a long period, publicly, and with less judicial oversight, we may end up not with more effective justice, but with a new form of political and reputational influence.
And we cannot remain silent in the face of this risk.
