The oil refinery crisis is just a “warm-up”: when to expect the real collapse of the Russian economy
6 May 18:51
Russia’s oil refining industry finds itself in a bind: as Ukrainian drones systematically take out major refineries from Omsk to Ryazan, the Kremlin is forced to choose between fueling tanks and maintaining stability at gas stations.
Ukraine has already managed to disable one-fifth of Russia’s refinery capacity, but experts warn: the real collapse of the Russian economy will begin not with fires at the plants, but with the shutdown of export terminals.
Why oil refineries are just a “warm-up” and where the aggressor’s real Achilles’ heel lies was examined by
As of 2026, there are about 30 large oil refineries operating in Russia, as well as more than 80 small so-called “mini-refineries.” Total crude oil refining capacity is estimated at approximately 6.5–6.8 million barrels per day, placing the country among the world leaders in this sector—alongside the U.S. and China
Russia’s Largest Refineries by Processing Capacity
| Refinery | Location | Capacity (thous. bpd) | Operator | Features |
| Omsk | Omsk | ~380 | Gazprom Neft | The largest and most technologically advanced |
| Kirishsky (KINEF) | Kirishi | ~330–340 | Surgutneftegaz | Key for the European part |
| Angarsk | Angarsk | ~370–380 | Rosneft | Exports to Asia |
| NORSI | Kstovo | ~290 | Lukoil | Modern fuel production |
| Ryazan | Ryazan | ~250–300 | Rosneft | Supplies central Russia |
| Yaroslavl (YANOS) | Yaroslavl | ~300 | Slavneft | Major fuel producer |
| Perm | Perm | ~220–235 | Lukoil | Regional center of the Urals |
| Volgograd | Volgograd | ~190–300 | Lukoil | South and Export |
| Salavat | Salavat | ~250 | Gazprom | Petrochemical Complex |
| Ufa Oil Refineries | Ufa | ~300 (total) | Bashneft | Powerful cluster |
During March–April 2026, attacks on energy infrastructure intensified significantly. In particular, the Tuapse Oil Refinery, as well as the Novokuybyshevsk plant, were forced to halt operations several times due to fires following strikes.
The Ryazan and Nizhny Novgorod refineries, which are among the key fuel suppliers for the Moscow region, are operating erratically: due to damage to primary processing units, they regularly reduce production volumes.
At the end of April, strikes were also recorded at the Orsk and Perm oil refineries, further complicating the situation in the industry.
As a result of these losses, Russian authorities were forced to extend restrictions on gasoline exports in an effort to avoid a shortage in the domestic market and curb rising fuel prices.
Where the Real “Bottleneck” in Oil Revenues Lies
Despite regular attacks on Russian oil refineries, the key blow to the Russian economy lies elsewhere. This was discussed in an exclusive commentary for
According to the expert, the widespread perception of the critical role of refineries in generating Russia’s export revenues is not entirely accurate.
“Russia does not sell petroleum products. Russia sells crude oil,” Pendzin emphasizes.
That is why, he says, strikes on oil refineries do not have a direct, decisive impact on the country’s foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, attacks on refineries do have significant consequences, but they are primarily domestic.
“The destruction of oil refineries hits Russia’s domestic market and reduces the ability to produce diesel fuel for the Russian armed forces,” the economist explains.
As a result, Russia is facing a fuel shortage and has already been partially forced to import it, although this is highly unusual for the Russian Federation.
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The main target—export terminals
According to Pendzin, the key to real economic pressure lies not in the refineries themselves, but in export logistics. To strike at Russia’s economy in terms of export revenues, one must target the loading terminals. This refers, in particular, to facilities such as the Novorossiysk oil terminals, which handle the transshipment of oil for export.
“About 70% of Russia’s exports go through the Baltic Sea. That is where the most vulnerable points are,” says Pendzin.
It is precisely these routes that determine the stability of revenue flows into the Russian budget.
Meanwhile, Taras Zagorodniy, managing partner of the National Anti-Crisis Group and an economist, also agrees with Oleg Pendzin and adds that the key factor is indeed not the number of oil refineries taken out of service, but Russia’s ability to transport oil for export. That is why, he says, logistics hubs should be the primary targets.
The expert emphasizes that strikes on port infrastructure and key export routes are the most effective.
“The greatest interest lies in strikes against terminals on the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as against oil pumping stations,” he explains.
After all, if oil transportation is disrupted, it has systemic consequences for the entire industry. In such a case, Russia would even be forced to cut production, which is the most painful scenario for its economy.
Zagorodniy acknowledges that oil refineries are important, but their role is different.
“Refineries are more about supplying fuel to the military, the agricultural sector, and the domestic market,” he says.
In other words, taking them out of commission creates domestic problems but does not immediately hit export revenues.
According to Zagorodniy, an effective strategy involves a combination of strikes against various elements of the system. That is, terminals come first, followed by oil pipelines and even tankers.
According to the expert, it is precisely this combination of actions that can seriously limit Russia’s ability to export oil.
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